Enforceability of a Prenuptual Agreement

Barth v. Barth
2010-Ohio-425
Fourth Appellate District
Washington County

Appellant, Jackie Barth, appeals the Trial Court's ("TC") decision awarding her husband, Appellee Christopher Barth, certian real property in their divorce action. Specifically, the Appellant states the TC erred in finding th parties had entered into a valid, binding premarital agreement and objects to the resulting property division.

Two days prior to their marriage, Appellant signed a premarital agreement which had been prepared by Appellee's father, melvin Barth. The premarital agreement concerned real property and a residence that was to be constructed after the marriage. The premarital agreement was drafted to protect real property transferred to appellee more than two years before the marriage took place. After the marriage, Melvin Barth arranged for a series of transfers of money from his wife's mother and aunt to pay for the construction of the home. The controbutions from the women totaled approximately $190,000.

From the Opinion:
{¶10} Though the provisions of the document itself were not in dispute, the parties' testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution was vastly different. Appellee and Melvin Barth testified that: Appellant willingly provided information for the creation of the agreement, namely her debts and assets; she was given a copy of the full agreement for her review prior to the day she signed it; she understood the terms of the agreement, including that it was to protect the money being transferred to Appellee for the construction of the house; she was told that, if she did not sign the agreement, the money to build the house would not be forthcoming, and she had a discussion with Melvin Barth to that effect; and Melvin Barth specifically told her the document was a premarital agreement.

Directly contradicting that testimony, Appellant testified that: she had nothing to do with creating the agreement, but she did admit to providing her father-in-law information about her assets; she was not provided a copy of the agreement before she signed it and had never seen any part of it until the day she signed it; the document she signed was not the full, premarital agreement; she never read the agreement and did not know what she was signing; a discussion about the availability of the money to build the house being contingent upon her signing the agreement never took place; she was told the agreement was just insurance to protect her and her children from the potential claims of her previous spouses; the document was never referred to as a premarital agreement; and had she known it was a premarital agreement, she never would have signed it.

As the parties do not contest the terms of the agreement itself, but rather the circumstances surrounding its execution, the validity and enforceability of the agreement are issues of fact. The magistrate determined that while the testimony of both parties could be seen as selfserving, Appellant’s version of events was less credible than Appellee’s. The magistrate found that the agreement contained both detailed information regarding the parties’ respective assets and an acknowledgement concerning each party’s right to seek the advice of counsel, which was located
immediately above the dated and notarized signatures. Further, the magistrate found the parties had signed not only the primary document but also the exhibits listing the parties assets and liabilities and an acknowledgement that each had received copies of the other parties’ exhibits.

As previously stated, determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement is primarily an issue for the trier of fact. That deference is particularly appropriate in the present case, where the parties’ testimony is factually contradictory on a number of vital issues, including whether Appellant was provided with a copy of the document prior to the day of signing, and whether the document was understood to be a premarital agreement. “The underlying rationale for appellate courts to defer to the trier of fact on matters of evidence weight and witness credibility is that the trier of fact is best positioned to view the witnesses and to observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections and to use those observations to weigh credibility.” Cox Paving, Inc. v. Indell Constr. Corp., 4th Dist. No. 08CA11 at ¶11, citing Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610, 615, 614 N.E.2d 742; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80,
461 N.E.2d 1273.

Here, the magistrate found Appellant’s version of events to be less credible than Appellee’s version. Under the particular circumstances of the case, we cannot say the trial court, which adopted the magistrate’s decision, abused its discretion in determining that Appellant entered into the premarital agreement with full knowledge and without fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching. Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.