What Happens When a Juvenile Court and a Domestic Relations Court Both Assert Jurisdiction and Then Enter Different, Potentially Conflicting Orders?

Heisler v. Heisler 2010-Ohio-98
Fourth Appellate District
Hocking County

This case is on appeal from the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas where Mr. Heisler’s motion to modify a divorce decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities was dismissed.

A year after Mr. Heisler filed his motion, the parties reached an agreement, which was reduced to a handwritten entry signed by both parties. Mr. Heisler was ordered to present a formal agreed entry. Before Ms. Heisler received her copies, their son became subject to delinquency and truancy charges in Fairfield County Juvenile Court. Ms. Heisler then argued that, due to the action in Fairfield County Juvenile Court, that Hocking County had lost Jurisdiction to decide the motion to modify. The Hocking County Court of Common Pleas dismissed Mr. Heisler’s motion.

In his appeal, Mr. Heisler claims that the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas retained jurisdiction over the allocation of parental rights despite a pending delinquency matter in the Fairfield County Juvenile Court. The court held that the courts had concurrent jurisdiction and “where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the general rule is that the court where proceedings are first properly initiated acquired the right to adjudicate the matter to the exclusion of all other courts.” See State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 279, 364 N.E.2d 33.

From the Opinion:

A DR Court that enters an order allocating parental rights and responsibilities retains jurisdiction of those issues. R.C. 3109.06 provides, in part: “In any case in which a court of common pleas, or other court having jurisdiction, has issued an order that allocates parental rights and responsibilities for the care of minor children and designates their place of residence and legal custodian of minor children, has made an order...the jurisdiction of the courts shall not abate upon the death of the person awarded custody but shall continue for all purposes during the minority of the children. The court, upon its own motion or the motion of either parent or of any interested person acting on behalf of the children may proceed to make further disposition of the case in the best interests of the children and subject to sections 3109.42 to 3109.48 of the Revised Code.

But, somewhat contradictorily, a juvenile court obtains “exclusive original jurisdiction” concerning the custody of a child against whom delinquency is alleged. R.C. 2151.23(A). R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and (2) provide that “[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code as follows: (1) [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is alleged *** to be a juvenile traffic offender or a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child *** to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state[.]”

In In re Poling, 64 Ohio St.3d 211, 1992-Ohio-144, 594 N.E.2d 589, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, despite the “not a ward of another court” language, a juvenile court may issue orders concerning the custody of a child who is the subject of a previous custody order contained in a separate domestic relations court’s divorce decree. Id. at syllabus. In effect, when a domestic relations court enters a decree addressing the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning a child, the child does not become a “ward” of the domestic relations court for purposes of R.C. 2151.23. Id. at 214. The Court further held that where a domestic relations court has entered a decree regarding the custody of the child, and the child later comes under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the courts share “concurrent jurisdiction” over the custody of the child. Id. at 215.

Where courts share concurrent jurisdiction, the general rule is that the court where proceedings are first properly initiated acquires the right to adjudicate the matter to the exclusion of all other courts. See State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 364 N.E.2d 33, at syllabus; Miller v. Court of Common Pleas (1944), 143 Ohio St. 68, 70, 54 N.E.2d 130. Under this rule, the domestic relations court, which first established jurisdiction through the divorce decree, would retain exclusive jurisdiction to entertain custody issues involving a child the subject of an earlier divorce decree in that court. But in Poling the Court held that the legislative scheme set forth in R.C. 2151.23 (requiring juvenile courts to determine custody matters in accordance with R.C. 3109.04) indicated that juvenile courts may nonetheless make “particularized determinations regarding the care and custody of children subject to its jurisdiction, while respecting the continuing jurisdiction of the domestic relations or common pleas court that makes a custody decision in a divorce case.” Poling at 216.

The Trial Court did not address the more troubling issue of what happens when a juvenile court and a domestic relations court, possessing concurrent jurisdiction over the issues of custody and allocation of parental rights, both assert jurisdiction and then enter different, potentially conflicting orders. But we need not address that quandary. We are only faced with the question of whether Hocking County retained jurisdiction over the support matters addressed in the Memorandum Entry. And based on Poling, we hold that it did. Fairfield County Juvenile Court shares concurrent jurisdiction over the issue of custody by virtue of the delinquency charges. But this action did not divest Hocking County of the ability to modify its existing divorce decree.